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Malaysian economic development has been shaped by public policy in response to 
changing national and external conditions. Public investments peaked in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, until the policy reversals driven by sovereign debt concerns and new policy 
ideology fads. Foreign investments continued to be favoured after independence for 
ethnic political reasons. Thus, foreign investments continued to be very significant in 
financial services as well as manufacturing growth, both for import substitution from 
the 1960s and for export from the 1970s. Private investments were attracted by 
government provision of infrastructure, cheap but schooled labour, tax incentives, lax 
environmental regulations and an undervalued currency. Poverty reduction and 
ownership redistribution by ethnicity were most successful during the 1970s and early 
1980s, although it is unclear how much these improved inter-ethnic relations. Economic 
liberalization and the growing influence of business interests and political elites have 
undermined the government’s developmental role, culminating in the 1997–8 financial 
crisis and lacklustre growth since. Malaysian industrialization could only have been 
achieved with appropriate incentives for investments and technical progress through key 
policy interventions. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper offers a review of Malaysia’s economic growth and structural change over 
the half century since Malaya (later Peninsular Malaysia) gained independence in 1957 
and Malaysia was formed six years later in 1963. At least five regimes with different 
priorities can be distinguished in Malaysian economic development from 1957 to the 
end of the Mahathir era in late 2003. The economic role of government, particularly in 
terms of public finance and public spending, is found to have played an important part 
in shaping the generally impressive record of post-colonial economic development in 
Malaysia. This should make clear that Malaysia’s generally impressive post-colonial 
economic development has been largely due to appropriate government interventions 
and reforms, rather than a simple reliance on market forces, as often suggested in some 
of the literature on the country. 
During the colonial period, authority over plan formulation and implementation rested 
with senior British officials mainly concerned with imperial interests and committed to 
protecting the predominantly British plantation and mining interests in Malaya. Colonial 
bias for these interests was reflected in public development expenditure that prioritized 
economic infrastructure to service the primary commodity export economy. As Britain’s 
most profitable colony, Malaya provided much of the export earnings that financed 
British post-war reconstruction. Legal developments during this era played an important 
role in shaping and developing British Malaya. During the early and mid-1950s, the 
colonial government initiated reforms, including rural development and affirmative 
action efforts in education that further boosted output and productivity.  
Independence in 1957 was followed by a dozen of years of post-colonial economic 
diversification with limited government intervention. Generally, laissez-faire policies 
were pursued, with some import substituting industrialization, agricultural 
diversification, rural development and ethnic affirmative action efforts. A period of 
growing state intervention followed the post-election race riots of May 1969. The New 
Economic Policy (NEP) legitimized increasing government intervention and public 
sector expansion for inter-ethnic redistribution and rural development to reduce poverty. 
Export-oriented industrialization also generated considerable employment, especially 
for women, while increased petroleum revenues financed rapidly growing state 
spending.  
Expansionary public expenditure from the 1970s continued after Mahathir became 
Prime Minister in mid-1981. However, spending was cut from mid-1982, but 
government-sponsored heavy industries grew as other foreign investments declined. 
Thus, state intervention under Mahathir shifted from inter-ethnic redistribution to heavy 
industrialization. From the mid-1980s, the economic slowdown and massive foreign 
debt build-up from the early 1980s led to massive ringgit depreciation and economic 
liberalization accompanied by privatization and greater government support for the 
private sector, including new investment incentives and regressive tax reforms. The new 
measures favouring private investment resulted in a decade of rapid growth until the 
1997–8 financial crisis led to renewed state intervention for crisis management and 
economic recovery, including currency controls and bail out facilities for the banking 
sector and some favoured corporate interests.   2
2  The Alliance phase (1957–69) 
In preparing for political independence, the British ensured that the leftist anti-colonial 
forces who threatened their economic interests were curbed, while ethnic elites 
committed to protecting interests were groomed to eventually inherit state office to 
ensure continuity in economic policy-making. With attaining independence in August 
1957, the Alliance—a coalition of the political elites from the three major ethnic 
groups—formally took over political authority in Malaya. Not unlike other newly 
independent countries, the post-colonial government embarked upon a programme of 
economic development emphasizing economic diversification. The post-colonial 
government continued to promote private enterprise and encourage foreign investment 
inflows, while the economic interests of the ex-colonial power were protected. 
The Alliance government’s economic development strategy reflected the class interests 
represented by the major parties in the ruling coalition and the political compromise 
among their leaders and with the colonial power. Consistent with this compromise, the 
state pursued basically laissez-faire policies with minimal state interference—and small 
budget deficits—except in ensuring attractive conditions for new investments. The 
post-colonial government was committed to defending British business interests in 
Malaya, which also enabled the predominantly Chinese local businesses to consolidate 
and strengthen their position. Development policy during this phase was therefore 
influenced by these compromises. The essentially laissez-faire approach precluded 
direct government participation in profitable activities, which were left to the private 
sector. Hence, a relatively low proportion of public development expenditure was 
allocated to commerce and industry. Within this overall strategy, the government made 
some highly publicized, but nonetheless feeble attempts to promote the interests of the 
nascent Malay business community, while also undertaking rural development 
programmes to secure predominantly Malay rural electoral support. 
Increased allocations for social services, particularly education, reflected the increased 
commitment to utilize educational expenditure to create a Malay middle class besides 
meeting the human resource requirements of the rapidly growing and modernizing 
Malaysian economy. Government agricultural development policies were essentially 
conservative. Rural development efforts were constrained by the government’s 
reluctance to act against politically influential landed, commercial and financial 
interests. The main thrust of rural development efforts involved new land development 
by the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), other measures to increase 
agricultural productivity and rural incomes, as well as greater provision of rural 
facilities such as roads, schools, clinics, irrigation etc.  
During the early years after independence, the major physical development initiatives in 
the country were reflected in the annual budgets and the five-year Malaysia Plans. 
Almost all the infrastructure developments undertaken before the late 1980s were 
financed by the government, averaging about a third of overall public expenditure. 
Private sector involvement in infrastructure was largely for construction and did not 
involve much financing or revenue collection by the government from such 
developments.  
Development policy in the 1960s emphasized growth, assuming that its benefits would 
trickle down. Malaysia achieved impressive growth, with considerable infrastructure 
development, although economic diversification in both agriculture and industry was   3
limited despite efforts to reduce Malaya’s overreliance on tin and rubber on two main 
fronts. First, plantations were encouraged to grow other crops, particularly oil palm, 
with an increasing number of FELDA-sponsored land development schemes also 
planted with oil palm. Second, the state encouraged manufacturing by offering 
incentives, and providing infrastructure and other supportive economic measures. 
The government promoted moderate import substituting industrialization, passing the 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance and creating facilitative institutions. However, due to the 
limited size of the domestic market, limited domestic linkages, growing unemployment 
and other problems, the government gradually shifted to export-oriented 
industrialization from the late 1960s. The Federal Industrial Development Authority—
now the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, or MIDA—was established to 
encourage industrial investment and the Industrial Incentives Act of 1968 was enacted, 
offering incentives to attract more labour-intensive export-oriented industries.  
Helped by favourable commodity prices and some early success in import substituting 
industrialization, the Malayan, and then Malaysian, economy sustained high growth 
with low inflation in the 1960s. At the time of independence and even in the late 1960s, 
the private sector was largely confined to local Chinese capitalists and the generally 
more powerful foreign investors. While the Chinese were mainly in retail and wholesale 
trade, rubber estates, tin mining, domestic transport, small-scale manufacturing and 
some banking, foreign interests dominated the formal economy, such as the large 
plantations, trading agencies, tin dredge mines, bigger banks and financial institutions 
(e.g. insurance), and manufacturing. Malay business interests were generally 
encouraged by the government through Bumiputera trust agencies and the state 
economic development corporations (SEDCs), with a few well-connected individuals 
spread over many boards desiring them for their political connections (Tan 1982). 
Official statistics suggest a worsening income distribution over the 1960s, including a 
growing gap between rural and urban areas. Inequality within the Malay community 
increased most among all major ethnic groups—from least intra-ethnic inequality in 
1957 to greatest inequality in 1970. However, this growing inequality did not only result 
in increased class tensions, but was primarily perceived in racial terms, not least 
because of widespread political mobilization along ethnic lines. Hence, Malay 
resentment to domination by capital was primarily expressed against ethnic Chinese, 
who comprised the bulk of businessmen, while non-Malay frustrations were directed 
against the Malay-dominated post-colonial state, widely identified with the United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the dominant partner in the ruling coalition. 
This led to racially-inspired opposition to the ruling coalition of ethnic parties in the 
Alliance in the 1960s, culminating in the ‘race riots’ of May 1969. Import substituting 
industrialization through tariff protection had generated relatively little employment and 
petered out by the mid-1960s, while rural development efforts emphasizing productivity 
avoided redistribution in favour of the poorly capitalized, land-hungry peasantry. At the 
May 1969 general elections, the ruling coalition’s grip on power was significantly 
challenged by non-Malay as well as Malay-based opposition parties. Following the 
elections, the incumbent Prime Minister’s position was undermined by his critics within 
the ruling party, who supported his deputy after ethnic riots—probably initiated by the 
youth wing of the ruling party, led by a State Chief Minister whose own position was 
threatened by the election results.    4
The poor electoral performance of the ruling coalition was probably the result of ethnic 
political mobilization, continued economic deprivation, growing unemployment, and 
inter-ethnic disparities despite respectable economic growth. The general election 
results and ‘race riots’ of May 1969 thus reflected some ethnic dimensions of the new 
post-colonial socioeconomic order. Meanwhile, the emerging Malay middle class, who 
had nominal political control, feared the gradual decline of British economic hegemony 
would lead to Chinese ascendance. This ‘political-bureaucratic’ faction, which had 
become more assertive from the mid-1960s, succeeded in establishing greater 
dominance after May 1969. 
3  The first decade of the New Economic Policy (1970–80) 
Announced in 1970 by Razak Hussein, then Deputy Prime Minister and Director of the 
National Operations Council, set up during the state of emergency after the events of 
May 1969, the New Economic Policy (NEP) sought to create the socioeconomic 
conditions for ‘national unity’ through massive economic redistribution programmes to 
achieve its twin prongs of ‘poverty eradication’ and ‘restructuring of society’. The 
NEP’s first Outline Perspective Plan for 1971–90 (OPP1) envisaged the incidence of 
poverty declining from 49 per cent in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970 to 16.7 per cent in 
1990. Meanwhile, ‘restructuring society’ efforts sought to reduce inter-ethnic economic 
disparities, to ‘eliminate the identification of race with economic function’. OPP1 
envisaged raising the Bumiputera share of corporate equity from 2.5 per cent in 1970 to 
30 per cent in 1990, ostensibly through growth, rather than redistribution of existing 
wealth. Through ethnically differentiated financing of, and controlled access to tertiary 
level education, the NEP would reduce inter-ethnic disparities in the professions and 
other lucrative occupations. 
Affirmative action programmes (for Bumiputera indigenes, especially Malays) from the 
early 1950s, which increased after independence and especially from the mid-1960s, 
had included preferential access to educational opportunities, business licences, as well 
as employment and promotion, especially in the public sector with the Malayanization 
of the civil service after independence. Greater Malay political hegemony after the 
events of May 1969 significantly enhanced such measures. Government intervention in 
the economy grew, and the number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) increased during 
the 1970s, ostensibly for the primary purpose of NEP-type redistribution.  
To raise the total Bumiputera share of corporate equity to 30 per cent by 1990 from 2.4 
per cent in 1970, the government began to find new ways and means to increase equity 
held by Bumiputera trust agencies as well as individuals. Educational spending 
significantly increased to finance a significant expansion of Bumiputera secondary and 
tertiary education, especially with the preferential allocation of scholarships to attend 
universities in Malaysia and abroad. Bumiputera have also been favoured for 
employment and promotion opportunities, not only in the government and state-owned 
enterprises, but also in the private sector, especially enterprises requiring government 
approval of some kind or other. 
Political and bureaucratic control over planning expanded in the 1970s—with greater 
state intervention and a considerably larger public sector, particularly to promote the 
growth of the Malay capitalist and middle classes. New legislation and institutions were 
set up for this purpose, often in the form of public enterprises, such as statutory bodies   5
enacted by legal statute. Examples of these include the Urban Development Authority 
(UDA), Pernas (Perbadanan Nasional Berhad), and the SEDCs. The other increasingly 
widespread form of public enterprise was government-owned (private or public limited) 
companies (Jomo 1995). Development policy in the 1970s thus saw greater state 
intervention in public resource allocation as well as public sector ownership and control 
of business enterprises. Though such policies began to adversely affect private 
investments and encourage capital flight, especially by ethnic Chinese, this was more 
than offset by growing public investments as well as foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
export-oriented industries. 
Export-oriented manufacturing in Malaysia in the 1970s was largely limited to the 
relatively low skill, labour-intensive aspects of production, especially electronic 
component assembly. Though more skilled and complex production processes and 
training have developed since, Malaysia has lagged further behind neighbouring 
Singapore. The likelihood of such progress has been determined by the interests and 
preferences of transnational corporations as well as host government policies. Export-
oriented industrialization has significant, but nonetheless limited potential for sustained 
and integrated industrial development, especially because of the technological and 
market dependence involved. Despite impressive performance, largely attributable to 
favourable resource endowments and external conditions and exaggerated by the high 
import content of non-resource based manufactured exports, export-led growth in the 
Malaysian economy is not sustainable indefinitely. The very success of export-led 
growth has probably discouraged more serious efforts to develop a more balanced and 
integrated national economy.  
Although the government attempted to portray itself as a neutral arbiter mediating 
between capital and labour in the 1960s and 1970s, it prioritized investment promotion, 
as reflected in various amendments to the labour laws. During the state of emergency 
after May 1969, labour legislation was amended to limit trade union organization and 
activity and to allow women to work around the clock, as desired by some of the new 
(mainly electronic) industries. Post-colonial labour legislation had been initially enacted 
to replace the special regulations introduced during the states of emergency against the 
communist-led insurgency (1948–60), but later reflected the changing labour policies of 
the post-colonial government. 
The promotion of more labour-intensive, export-oriented industries from the late 1960s 
succeeded in reducing unemployment, initially at the expense of real wages, until lower 
unemployment pushed wages up once again from the mid-1970s onwards. The Free 
Trade Zones Act in the early 1970s created new customs-free export-processing zones. 
After further ‘tightening’ labour laws in 1980, the industrial relations machinery and 
labour policies also changed, largely at the expense of employees and unions. Later, 
more amendments were introduced to tighten up the already restrictive labour laws, 
further limiting union rights, encouraging ‘in-house’ or company unions and increasing 
government control over employees, who comprised an increasing majority of the 
labour force.  
In the mid-1970s, petroleum production off the East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia 
began, and the government pushed through the 1974 Petroleum Development Act to 
ensure that the federal government—instead of the states—would capture the lion’s 
share of oil revenues. Petroleum revenue has played a crucial role in the country’s   6
development since; they have been used to bail out government-owned enterprises and 
to finance prestige projects. 
Relatively high economic growth, coupled with the expansion of labour-intensive, 
export-oriented industries and the public sector in the 1970s, led to declining 
unemployment through the decade. Also, emigration of Malaysian labour to Singapore 
and other countries increased in the mid- and late 1970s. Consequently, real wages rose 
and pockets of labour shortages emerged, usually in activities offering low wages and 
poor working conditions as well as future prospects. In order to offset the upward 
pressure on wages and to overcome labour shortages, the government adopted several 
measures, most notably by allowing labour immigration, primarily from Indonesia, 
Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines and later Bangladesh. While the magnitude of 
this immigration since the 1980s is difficult to measure, current estimates vary from 1.5 
to 4 million compared to a national population of 26 million and a labour force of over 
12 million. 
3.1 Mahathir’s  three  regimes 
In mid-1981, Mahathir Mohamad took over as Prime Minister of Malaysia when the 
world economy slowed down, lowering primary commodity prices, and Malaysia 
increased foreign borrowings despite much higher real interest rates from 1980. The 
increase in public expenditure in the early 1980s was originally counter-cyclical in 
intent, to compensate for declining private investment, both domestic and foreign. 
Under Mahathir’s leadership, public sector spending rose sharply—even after such 
counter-cyclical spending was cut back from mid-1982 onwards—to finance non-
financial public enterprises (NFPEs) in the first half of the 1980s. External debt more 
than tripled from 1980 to 1985, largely in the form of government-guaranteed external 
debt by the NFPEs. 
More than any other prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir wanted to transform 
Malaysia into a newly industrializing country under indigenous Bumiputera corporate 
leadership. While Mahathir’s policies eventually favoured various well-connected 
business interests, he has to be credited with the major development policy innovations 
from 1981 until his retirement in late 2003, including the ‘Look East’ policy, his labour 
policy, the ‘Malaysia Incorporated’ policy, the privatization policy, ‘Vision 2020’, and 
the policy responses to the 1997–8 crisis, among others. Three distinguishable economic 
policy regimes characterized the Mahathir administration. 
3.1.1  Mahathir regime 1: new roles for the state (1981–5) 
After taking over as Prime Minister, Mahathir introduced a second round of import 
substitution to promote various heavy industries, similar to the heavy and chemicals 
industrialization drive in South Korea under General Park Chung Hee in the 1970s. He 
initially continued to increase public sector employment in the face of global recession 
from the early 1980s onward. As the world economic slowdown dragged on and 
commodity prices continued to decline, continued economic growth became more 
dependent on public—rather than private—investment. The new Mahathir 
administration also hoped to secure a strong electoral mandate through such deficit 
spending. Soon after winning the April 1982 general elections, the government 
announced an austerity drive, cutting back public spending and reducing earlier job 
creation commitments.   7
The rapid increase in domestic public debt from the early 1970s was followed by some 
rise in sovereign foreign borrowings in the early 1980s as the current account deficit 
grew because of declining commodity export prices and weaker demand for 
manufactured exports (especially electronics), as private investments outside the oil and 
gas sector dropped sharply (World Bank 1983). Domestic private investments also 
continued to decline, largely due to capital flight associated with official ethnic 
discrimination against Chinese business interests. Malaysia did not experience many of 
the painful economic problems other less fortunate economies of the South had 
experienced in the 1980s. For instance, Malaysia never really suffered from capital 
shortages, and did not borrow heavily from abroad until the early 1980s—ironically, 
when liquidity was tighter and real interest rates higher. However, its borrowing binge 
soon came to an end in the mid-1980s. 
Malaysia’s mild economic recession during the mid-1980s was due to a combination of 
factors: global recession, lower primary commodity prices, reduced demand for 
manufactured exports, reduced foreign private investment inflows, declining domestic 
private investments, deflationary fiscal and monetary policies (except for certain 
spending priorities such as heavy industries), concentration of public investments in 
import substituting heavy industries characterized by low capital productivity, tighter 
international liquidity and higher real interest rates. Immediately, the government 
responded to the recession with various measures, such as deregulation as well as 
incentives to further encourage private investment.  
Spending was constrained by the sharp drop in oil prices in early 1986 to under US$10 
per barrel. The poor price outlook for petroleum forced a drastic downward revision of 
growth and public sector investment targets (later revised upwards with higher 
petroleum and rubber prices in 1987 and increased logging). The major primary 
commodity price collapses—involving palm oil, tin and petroleum—and the electronics 
business cycle’s low point occurred in 1985. Meanwhile, land and regional development 
authorities continued to clear forested areas for plantation agriculture, increasingly in 
Sabah and Sarawak. Agricultural diversification continued, with cocoa promising to be 
the new hope in Sabah in the 1980s, while oil palm’s success from the 1970s continued 
in most other parts of the country (Jomo, Chang, Khoo with others 2004). 
Malaysia’s resource wealth and relatively cheap labour have sustained production 
enclaves for the export of agricultural, forest, mineral and manufactured products. Much 
of the retained wealth generated has been captured by the business cronies of those in 
power, who have contributed to growth by reinvesting the captured rents, mainly in the 
‘protected’ domestic economy, e.g. in import substituting industries, commerce, 
services and privatized utilities and infrastructure. 
3.1.2 Mahathir regime 2: inducing private investments (1986–1997) 
By the mid-1980s, there was growing dissatisfaction with the government among many, 
including Bumiputeras, both in the public and private sectors, with some criticizing 
what they considered government interference unfair in the business world. Large 
Malay-controlled business groups had emerged on the corporate scene and were calling 
for a less regulated economy. Indeed, some of them blamed excessive state intervention 
for slowing economic growth and undermining private business interests. Partial 
deregulation of the economy was probably a boon to the corporate sector, with most 
businesses benefiting, and hence supportive of further liberalization.    8
The key turning point for government policy, in terms of economic liberalization, 
occurred around 1985, following Daim Zainuddin’s appointment as Finance Minister in 
1984. The government introduced some economic liberalization measures, which 
coincided with the contraction of loss-making SOEs. These had grown in the 1960s and 
expanded rapidly in the 1970s (under the NEP), with new ones continuing to grow in 
the early 1980s as others began contracting. SOE losses wasted precious investment 
resources, increased the government’s financial burden and allegedly slowed economic 
growth. Privatization, officially announced in 1983, gained vigour and the government 
actively began privatizing its assets until there were some 200 privatization projects in 
the pipeline by the mid-1990s. Privatization was supposed to reduce government 
expenditure, improve efficiency, encourage private sector involvement in government 
activities, and provide Bumiputeras with more opportunities to participate in such 
activities. 
The government also sought to attract new, especially foreign investments, with the 
1986 Promotion of Investments Act (Jomo 2007b; Jomo with Wong 2008). The timing 
was perfect, as manufacturers from Northeast Asia (especially Japan and later Taiwan) 
relocated their industries to take advantage of the enhanced incentives, relatively good 
infrastructure and more lax environmental and other regulations, as well as 
comparatively lower production costs due to the lower wages and devalued exchange 
rates.  
The 1988 withdrawal of privileges under the General System of Preferences from the 
first-tier East Asian new industrialized economies (NIEs) also encouraged relocation of 
production facilities abroad. Meanwhile, reforms, selective deregulation as well as new 
rules and incentives made relocation in Southeast Asia as well as China more attractive. 
Malaysia greatly benefited from investments from these East Asian economies 
experiencing rising production costs (due to tighter labour markets), strengthened 
intellectual property rights as well as stricter environmental regulations. From late 1985 
onwards, the Japanese yen and then the Korean won, the new Taiwanese dollar and the 
Singapore dollar appreciated against the US dollar, and hence even more against the 
ringgit, enhancing Malaysia’s attractiveness to foreign investors, particularly those from 
East Asia.  
After the government introduced new liberalizing economic policy reforms, business 
sentiment improved. In addition, new investments poured in from more developed 
countries in East Asia, notably Japan, Singapore and later Taiwan, Province of China. 
As the government policy reform efforts not only benefited foreign investors, but were 
also seen as encouraging non-Malay investors, domestic firms became more supportive 
of policy reforms. Politically influential corporate groups developed various means to 
better advance their interests, while appreciating the greater freedom and flexibility, as 
well as reduced tax burdens and regulations. 
Initially driven by East Asian export-oriented manufacturing investments, the Malaysian 
economy recovered significantly from 1987, and maintained growth rates of over 8 per 
cent per annum for a decade from 1988 onwards. Thus, the policy changes of the mid-
1980s appeared successful in reviving growth and industrialization. The time sequence 
has encouraged the attribution of the economic boom to the policy changes. However, 
as the preceding account suggests, while several developments occurring at the same 
time may all have contributed to the recovery, it is difficult to disaggregate their 
respective contributions. Growth in Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia seems to have   9
accelerated in the late 1980s as well, and although most of these countries also 
introduced some economic liberalization measures around the same time, there is no 
evidence that the most successful or fastest growing have been the most liberalized 
economies, or even that trade or financial liberalization measures—as opposed to 
specific investment incentives—contributed crucially to the boom. 
In 1990, the twenty-year period (1971–90) of the first OPP1 for Malaysia’s NEP came 
to an end. The ambitious NEP redistribution targets had been largely achieved by then, 
with most progress made before the mid-1980s. Despite some controversy over the 
reliability and comparability of official data, the reduction in the incidence of poverty 
according to official indicators was impressive, declining from 49 per cent in 1970 to 
17.1 per cent in 1990, very close to the 16.7 per cent target. 
Inter-ethnic economic disparities of various types had also declined significantly, e.g. 
the gaps among mean household incomes by ethnicity narrowed. Ethnic proportions in 
economic activities and occupations increasingly reflected demographic shares except 
in agriculture and government services (which remained predominantly Bumiputera) 
and in wholesale and retail trade (which remained Chinese-dominated). For eight 
well-remunerated professions, the Bumiputera share rose from 6 per cent in 1970 to 25 
per cent in 1990, with continued ongoing increases in the Bumiputera share. Through 
government regulation of business opportunities and investments as well as preferential 
policies for Bumiputera businesses, the Bumiputera share of equity in public listed 
companies rose from 1.5 per cent in 1969 to 18 per cent in 1983, before hovering 
around 20 per cent since then. Meanwhile, various observers have claimed considerable 
official underestimation of the actual size of the Bumiputera share of corporate wealth. 
Yet, despite considerable achievement of the OPP1 targets, it is far from clear how 
much progress had been made in achieving ‘national unity’, the NEP’s ostensible 
purpose, e.g. as reflected in reduced inter-ethnic resentment or improved inter-ethnic 
relations. For example, relations between Malays and Chinese were, arguably, rather 
tense in 1987 due to the political machinations of certain political leaders. However, 
with some cultural and educational deregulations from the mid-1980s and the economic 
boom of the 1990s, ethnic tensions seemed to recede somewhat. Meanwhile, regional 
grievances—especially in Sabah and Sarawak—became more pronounced, while ethnic 
minorities—both non-Malay Bumiputeras and non-Chinese non-Bumiputeras—became 
more alienated. 
With the 1991 enunciation of Vision 2020 to achieve growth, modernization and 
industrialization, instead of the NEP’s emphasis on inter-ethnic redistribution, foreign 
investors continued to be courted. The government also further reduced restrictions on 
ethnic Chinese capital, which had been encouraged by various other reforms, e.g. easier 
listing on the stock market, greater official encouragement of small and medium 
industries, other official efforts mitigating the 1975 Industrial Co-ordination Act as well 
as greater overall emphasis on the market, rather than regulatory measures. Hence, 
domestic investments were encouraged by the partial liberalization from the mid-1980s 
onwards. As many Chinese-owned firms were able to obtain stock market listing, they 
could tap into the domestic capital market for funds. However, it remains unclear 
whether public listing has been primarily intended to raise capital or to enable the 
owners to ‘cash out’.    10
In the early and mid-1990s, official policy encouraged Malaysian firms (especially large 
corporations) to invest in other developing countries in Southeast Asia, as well as 
Africa, South Pacific, the central Asian former Soviet republics, and even Europe and 
the US (Jomo 2002). The Malaysian South-South Corporation Berhad (Masscorp) was 
formed to help large Malaysian firms invest elsewhere in the ‘South’. The government 
helped such firms by setting up agencies to facilitate trade, export credit and insurance, 
signing double taxation agreements with various countries, and organizing numerous 
trade and investment missions led by government ministers. However, this policy was 
suspended following the 1997–8 crisis in an attempt to revive domestic investments.  
Over the years, the government has changed its industrialization strategy. In response to 
problems and new priorities, the government announced the Second Industrial Master 
Plan for 1996–2005 in December 1996 to replace the (first) Industrial Master Plan for 
1986–95. In September 1996, the government had set up the Multimedia Super Corridor 
to promote certain information technology investments. The government committed 
over RM50 billion for infrastructure development to support this initiative. At the same 
time, the government strengthened intellectual property laws to reassure foreign 
investors and provided more generous incentives for new investments in this area.  
Thus, the policy changes of the mid-1980s appeared successful in reviving growth and 
industrialization. Confirmation of the new policy direction from the mid-1980s came 
with the 1991 enunciation of Vision 2020, favouring growth, modernization and 
industrialization. Although FDI began levelling off in the mid-1990s, increased 
domestic investments—inspired by greater domestic investor confidence—sustained the 
momentum of rapid economic growth until the 1997–8 regional crisis. The gravity of 
the crisis and the difficulties of recovery were exacerbated by injudicious policy 
responses, compromised by cronyism, though there is little persuasive evidence that 
cronyism itself precipitated the crisis. 
3.1.3 Mahathir  regime  3:  crisis management, 1997–2003 
The 1997–8 East Asian economic crises began as currency crises following deregulation 
and other developments associated with financial liberalization and globalization, i.e. 
the subversion of effective financial governance at both international and national levels 
(Jomo 2004, 2007a; Wong and Jomo with Chin 2005). Crony capitalism and rent-
seeking had also been rife, but did not precipitate and cannot explain the crisis. 
However, cronyism, nepotism and new crisis-induced political developments 
compromised official policy responses as the crisis unfolded. With confidence 
undermined, the crisis worsened, further delaying recovery. The currency and financial 
crises thus became a crisis of the ‘real economy’ in Malaysia mainly due to poor 
government policy responses.  
Despite the official claim that the ringgit was pegged to a ‘basket of the currencies of 
Malaysia’s main trading partners’, it was virtually pegged to the US dollar for decades 
from the mid-1970s, albeit at different rates. This offered certain advantages, especially 
exchange rate stability. Low inflation was desired by the politically influential financial 
sector. Such priorities reflected the weaker influence of export manufacturers in 
Malaysia on economic policy-making (where much industrial capability outside of 
ethnic Chinese dominated resource-based manufacturing is foreign-owned), compared 
to the financial community.    11
Meanwhile, equity finance grew in significance from the 1980s onwards in Malaysia. 
Domestic financial sector reforms had also reduced the powers and jurisdiction of the 
central bank. Not surprisingly, bank intermediation declined in overall importance and 
contributed proportionately less to financing productive investments. In spite of 
deregulation measures, government controls on the economy have not disappeared. For 
instance, in the banking sector, the central bank still guides liberalization of the 
industry, having forced local banks to merge, ostensibly to give them a better chance of 
survival as the industry opens up to foreign participation. Meanwhile, foreign banks 
already in Malaysia have been repositioning themselves to take advantage of the new 
opportunities with the changing policy and regulatory environment as the government 
prepares to open up the country’s banking system to other foreign banks. The Securities 
Commission, set up to regulate the equities market, has put new regulations in place. 
Unfortunately, few such reforms have prioritized the governance requirements of new 
development challenges, but have instead been principally concerned with market 
developments and political pressures.  
Capital inflows—into the stock market as well as through bank borrowings—helped 
finance current account deficits due to the growing proportion of ‘non-tradables’ 
produced in Malaysia, mainly related to construction. These inflows were ‘sterilized’ to 
minimize consumer price inflation, as desired by the financial community, but instead 
fuelled asset price inflation, mainly involving real estate and share prices. Following the 
mid-1995 reversal of the decade-long yen appreciation, the over-valued ringgit and 
other regional currencies plus the new financial investment opportunities, following 
partial financial liberalization, created the conditions for the asset price inflationary 
bubbles that later burst with devastating consequences for the region.  
The Malaysian crisis was exacerbated by poor policy responses. Crony capitalism and 
rent-seeking had been rife, but did not precipitate and cannot explain the crisis. 
However, cronyism, nepotism and new crisis-induced political developments 
undoubtedly compromised official policy responses as the crisis unfolded. Confidence 
in the government was thus further undermined, which exacerbated the crisis, and thus 
delayed recovery. The currency and financial crisis thus became a crisis of the ‘real 
economy’ in Malaysia mainly due to poor government policy responses. 
The currency and financial crises suggest that Malaysia’s decade-long economic boom 
until 1997 was built on some fragile and unsustainable foundations. Meanwhile, limited 
and inappropriate public investments have held back the development of greater 
industrial and technological capabilities. Although Malaysia has been reliant on foreign 
resources, especially immigrant labour, future economic progress cannot be secured by 
relying on cheap labour alone. With less than full employment as well as slower 
investment and productivity growth, private investment as a share of gross national 
product has been lower since the 1997–8 crisis. 
4  Lessons from the Malaysian experience 
The preceding review suggests that Malaysia has gone through several different 
development strategies in the 50 years since attaining independence, broadly 
identifiable with the four different prime ministers before current premier Abdullah 
Badawi took office in late 2003. However, despite some important differences between 
them, the second and third premiers are considered together here while three distinct 
phases are identified with Mahathir’s 22 year tenure. Malaysian economic development   12
policy has thus been primarily shaped by the nature of the regimes the dominant 
interests represented, and their respective views of what would be desirable to advance 
their own interests and secure legitimacy in order to remain in power.  
During the late colonial period, in the face of a communist-led insurgency in the early and 
mid-1950s, the British colonial government initiated social reforms, including rural 
development efforts to consolidate a Malay yeoman peasantry, protect labour and allow 
limited popular political participation through elections. In the first dozen or so years 
after independence in 1957, largely laissez-faire policies were pursued by the first Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. These were complemented by ‘mild’ import 
substituting industrialization, some agricultural diversification, greater rural 
development efforts and modest, but increasing ethnic affirmative action policies. 
The next dozen years saw growing state intervention under the second and third Prime 
Ministers, Razak Hussein (1970–6) and Hussein Onn (1976–81). The NEP provided the 
legitimization for increasing state intervention and public sector expansion, especially 
for inter-ethnic redistribution. Meanwhile, export-oriented industrialization from the late 
1960s succeeded in reducing unemployment, while increased petroleum revenues 
financed rapidly growing public expenditure. 
The heavy industrialization push began under the leadership of Malaysia’s fourth Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad during the early and mid-1980s. Counter-cyclical 
expansionary public expenditure expansion from 1980 was followed by budget cuts 
from mid-1982, but government-sponsored joint ventures with Japanese firms to 
develop heavy industries—constituting a second round of import substitution—grew in 
the face of declining foreign investments. The economic slowdown and other 
difficulties of the mid-1980s led to some economic and cultural liberalization. Massive 
ringgit depreciation from the mid-1980s was accompanied by privatization, greater 
official support for the private sector, increased investment incentives and regressive 
‘supply side oriented’ tax reforms.  
Significant relocation of manufacturing investments from Japan and the other first-
generation newly industrialized East Asian economies resulted in a decade of sustained 
growth and rapid industrialization in Malaysia and its immediate neighbours. These 
policies were reversed by the regional economic crisis in 1997–8 which led to increased 
government intervention, especially to protect politically influential Malaysian business 
interests. 
The preceding review of Malaysia’s five distinct periods of development policy since 
independence has also suggested that policy changes followed political changes, 
especially the political crisis culminating in the events of May 1969. During Mahathir’s 
long tenure from 1981 onwards, policy changes were driven by economic crises—in 
1981–2, 1985–6 and 1997–8. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that new policies 
responded to apparent problems and failures of earlier policies. Officially, however, 
these transitions were often presented as obvious transitions, involving inevitable or 
natural progressions. This impression has been reinforced by the political longevity of 
the ruling coalition, which has held on to political power at the crucial central or federal 
level since 1955, when the first general elections were held in anticipation of imminent 
independence in 1957.    13
All five periods considered here are discussed in nuanced and therefore chequered 
terms, with no unqualified successes or failures. Each set of policy innovations 
responded, albeit in flawed ways, to problems and challenges emerging in earlier times. 
The stimuli were often political, rather than economic, or perhaps more correctly, they 
were usually the political and cultural expressions of developmental, economic and 
social shortcomings. Infrastructure provision was a common feature of all five phases, 
albeit in very different ways and always in combination with other policy initiatives and 
institutional innovations. 
Hence, prior conditions have always been important, but not in a deterministic way. 
Rather, policy interventions invariably sought to overcome constraints and difficulties 
inherited from the past. But, of course, options and choices were not unlimited, but very 
much constrained by available human, natural, financial, external and other resources. 
Over time, some of these resources could be increased and transformed into other types 
of resources to some extent. For example, natural resources can be more or less 
efficiently transformed into financial resources, but other factors determine how 
effectively such resources are invested and deployed for economic development (Khan 
and Jomo 2000). 
The preceding review does not provide an easy formula for developmental success. The 
analysis has emphasized the political economy of policy-making and institutional 
change, but this does not mean that path dependence ‘over-determines’ economic 
development, and that there is a single explanation for success or failure. Malaysia was 
among the ‘early birds’ in developing export processing zones, but with China’s 
emergence as the ‘manufacturing workshop’ of the world, this is less of a real option for 
most other developing countries for ‘fallacy of composition’ reasons. Also, little was 
gained by Malaysia from being an early bird in privatization or stock market promotion. 
The main advantage of a ‘latecomer’ is the ability to learn from earlier experiences. 
Unfortunately, Malaysia did not learn much from the North East Asian success with 
effective protection conditional on export promotion—combining import substitution 
with export orientation—or even heavy industrialization. And while it has made 
impressive gains with its affirmative action policies, it is hardly a model for emulation 
in terms of efficient or well targeted policies, let alone improved inter-ethnic relations, 
or even sustained social policy gains. 
With its relatively high per capita income compared to other developing countries and 
sustained growth over the decades, Malaysia did not need significant foreign capital to 
augment domestic private or public financial resources. Nevertheless, Malaysia 
continued to receive financial aid from abroad until the 1980s, although the nature of 
this assistance changed significantly over time. 
FDI has long been sought, although priorities have changed over time. Many believe 
such FDI has been encouraged to offset primarily ethnic Chinese domestic private 
investment. However, besides capital, FDI has also brought access to technology, 
markets and relevant managerial expertise. 
Some recent literature has claimed that trade liberalization or trade openness has been 
good for growth and development. Much of this literature has been challenged on 
theoretical and methodological grounds. Malaysia has undoubtedly grown more than 
most other developing countries, with much of the growth involving exports, initially of   14
tin, then rubber and other primary commodities, most notably palm oil, wood and 
petroleum. 
The earliest manufacturing industries involved processing primary commodities (e.g. 
natural rubber, tin). From the 1970s, assembly of intermediate imports and product 
testing became more important. The modest Malaysian value addition to these 
considerable imports has meant that gross trade or openness measures greatly 
exaggerate such growth unlike domestic resource processing, where export values 
reflect the full value added. Clearly, such aggregate measures offer little useful guidance 
to successful development policies or strategies. 
Malaysia’s varied and variegated experiences may offer some useful, but nevertheless 
complex and context-specific lessons for other developing countries at this time. The 
last two or three decades have seen very considerable economic liberalization on many 
fronts which imply very different conditions and constraints. Many of the poorest 
countries have been exempted from some of the trade and trade-related liberalization 
commitments associated with the World Trade Organization. But as many of them are 
heavily indebted, and therefore subject to conditionalities imposed by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, they are otherwise constrained besides facing various human, 
natural, financial and other resource constraints. 
In pursuing a development strategy making effective use of available resources, 
developing countries today are greatly limited by the requirements of trade openness 
further trade liberalization in their options for developing new productive capacities and 
capabilities. Regaining trade policy space is thus crucial. Without appropriate trade and 
other economic policy interventions, it will be difficult to create the necessary 
conditions for kick-starting development as well as creating and enhancing the needed 
new production capacities and capabilities. 
Incentives are needed to induce the needed investments and learning for rapid technical 
progress. Such inducements were needed for primary, as well as secondary and tertiary 
economic activities. Development and employment generation require such industrial 
and advanced service activities. Private agents are unlikely to undertake the needed 
initiatives and activities without state interventions to create the inducements for needed 
activities. Fiscal resources are also needed to provide the necessary infrastructure as 
well as other long term investments needed for development, but unlikely to be 
provided by private agents. 
5 Policy  lessons 
It is difficult to evaluate policy success or failure simply in terms of subsequent 
economic performance. Malaysia’s very open economy has often been subject to 
circumstances not of its own choosing or making.  
The decline of rubber prices in the 1960s must surely have affected economic 
performance and policy. Malaysia’s experiment with import substituting 
industrialization under foreign (principally British) auspices was quite different from 
most other developing countries’ experiences where state-owned enterprises played 
leading roles, as well as North East Asian ones where effective protection was 
conditional on export promotion. Malaysia’s transformation from net oil importer to   15
exporter in the mid-1970s, when petroleum prices rose sharply, gave the government 
much more fiscal leeway, while the recycling of petrodollars later allowed it to borrow 
from abroad at low cost. This favourable environment lasted until the Volcker 
intervention of 1980 raised real interest rates and precipitated a global recession, 
bringing down commodity prices.  
Malaysia was again favoured by international circumstances when the Plaza Accord of 
September 1985 led to the strong yen just as Malaysia’s sovereign foreign debt became 
yen-denominated. But then, the mid-1980s’ recession precipitated a banking crisis, 
which led to the 1989 banking reform. Following the apparent success of earlier 
deregulation, this facilitated financial liberalization, which culminated in the 1997–8 
crisis. The late 1980s’ regulatory reforms had encouraged further limited private foreign 
borrowings from abroad, limiting vulnerability on that front. The East Asian economic 
recovery after the last quarter of 1998, following the Russian and LTCM crises, 
similarly does not allow for an evaluation of the impact of Mahathir’s controversial 
measures of early September as he moved to politically eliminate his deputy Anwar 
Ibrahim. 
The very different economic policies pursued over the last half century as well as the 
often crucial role of exogenous circumstances makes an evaluation of ‘the’ Malaysian 
economic development strategy very complicated. Malaysia is considered successful 
because of its generally rapid rates of economic growth and structural transformation 
over this period. These achievements are often attributed by the Washington-based 
Bretton Woods institutions to its exceptionally open economy, in terms of trade and 
reliance on FDI, relatively low inflation, management of resource wealth and the 
political stability of its multiethnic society.  
In such approving accounts, two periods tend to be emphasized—the 1970s, which are 
associated with export-oriented industrialization and the second Mahathir period, i.e. the 
decade from 1988 to 1997, when there was a return to such export-oriented 
industrialization. Other aspects of these periods are mentioned less frequently, e.g. the 
huge growth of state intervention and the public sector in the 1970s or Mahathir’s other 
more heterodox policies. The import substituting industrialization of the 1960s and early 
1980s are seen as mistakes overcome by subsequent policies, while most government 
roles beyond macroeconomic management, infrastructure as well as basic social 
provisioning and maintaining law and order are considered to be undermining good 
governance and encouraging debilitating rent-seeking. 
However, a more heterodox view would underscore the role and impact of various 
widespread policy interventions. While some such interventions may be viewed as 
addressing market failures, other interventions cannot be justified in such terms, but 
were nonetheless crucial to Malaysia’s developmental success. The main problem, often 
recognized by Malaysian authorities, seems to be that development is not an automatic 
outcome of market processes. Hence, the criterion of market failure is hardly an 
adequate criterion to determine interventions required to achieve economic 
development. This is not to suggest that all policy interventions in Malaysia have been 
developmental, or even intended to promote economic development. And some of those 
meant to be developmental have been poorly conceived or badly implemented, or 
abused by politically influential business interests, or otherwise proven inappropriate. 
Others, e.g. instances of privatization in Malaysia, were ideologically-driven, but also 
captured for self-aggrandizement by the politically well connected.   16
The growing dominance of UMNO in the ruling coalition has meant that inter-ethnic 
redistribution, particularly to benefit politically connected business interests, has been 
the major underlying theme of much policy reform over the years. But the regime’s 
electoral longevity has not only relied on the advantages of long term incumbency, 
superior financial resources, a virtual media monopoly as well as an effectively 
controlled electoral system, but has also depended on its ability to deliver sustained 
economic growth, ‘law and order’, as well as some basic infrastructure and social 
provisioning. Malaysia has also been successful in leading in the production and even 
the processing of several primary commodities such as tin, rubber, palm oil, timber and 
cocoa, while its state-owned petroleum company has been better managed than many 
others in developing countries. It was also a leader in producing several electronics 
components and other manufactured products such as air-conditioners, airplane tyres 
and rubber gloves, though it now appears to have lost its lead in many of these, 
particularly with the rise of China as the manufacturing workshop of the world. 
Moreover, Mahathir’s car, steel and multimedia software initiatives appear to have been 
less than successful.  
But government involvement goes back to colonial rule. Owing to its economic 
significance for the British empire, Peninsular Malaysia’s infrastructure was quite well 
developed during the colonial period, while post-colonial infrastructure developments 
have continued to support economic development. During the colonial period, the 
British colonial power minimized export taxes on tin and rubber, then dominated by 
British corporate interests. Instead, (‘sin’) taxes on opium, alcohol, gambling and 
prostitution figured much more prominently before the Second World War, especially in 
the Straits Settlements ports under direct British control. British Malaya’s export 
earnings were the main source of foreign exchange for the Empire and British 
reconstruction after the Second World War. Imperial preference meant fewer taxes on 
Malayan imports from Britain compared to those from countries outside the Empire, 
and this continued for a time after independence as Commonwealth preference. 
Malaysia is often cited as an example of an open economy which has successfully 
achieved economic development. It is then suggested that trade liberalization and 
policies favouring FDI will lead to comparable growth and development. A more 
nuanced understanding of what actually happened in Malaysia suggests a more complex 
experience with different policy lessons. The preceding survey has highlighted how 
policies changed, why they changed as well as their outcomes or consequences. This 
has highlighted the domestic as well as international conditions prevailing. Most of 
Peninsular Malaysia’s arable land was under cultivation by the 1980s while the debate 
on the remaining scope for agricultural expansion in the Borneo states of Sabah and 
Sarawak continues. Perhaps more importantly, Malaysian agriculture only remains 
viable due to the continued availability of poorly remunerated immigrant labour since 
the 1980s, especially from Indonesia and the Indian subcontinent.  
After independence, tariffs were imposed on some imports to favour the new import 
substituting industries being promoted by the government in the early 1960s and early 
1980s. Meanwhile, taxes on smallholders were reduced to secure their electoral support. 
From the early 1970s, the Free Trade Zones Act enabled the establishment of customs-
exempt export processing zones as well as light manufacturing warehouses to promote 
export-oriented industrialization. These were augmented by the provision of 
infrastructure and other indirect subsidies as well as labour and training policies.    17
Various investment promotion policies over the decades have sought to encourage 
investments in particular sectors and industries. The privileged role of foreign 
investments in post-colonial Malaysia can be traced to the bargain made with the 
Malayan elite before independence in the face of a communist-led radical nationalist 
insurgency which threatened to nationalize British corporate interests. FDI was also 
encouraged to offset the ubiquitous Chinese business presence and its likely ascendance 
after independence and to secure advanced technology, access to foreign markets and 
foreign corporate expertise. Some investment regulations (e.g. the 1975 Industrial 
Coordination Act) and other constraints on ethnic Chinese capital accumulation may 
well have prevented a greater role for Malaysian entrepreneurship and corporate 
expansion comparable to Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Province of China.  
To equate such measures with an economy open to trade and FDI obfuscates the crucial 
role of selective interventions to promote certain investments and technology upgrading. 
The decline of such efforts in the last half decade since Mahathir’s retirement except for 
the government’s agricultural promotion initiatives have been associated with more 
modest growth at a time when many other developing countries have actually 
accelerated economic growth with higher primary commodity prices due to higher 
demand as well as low interest rates due to US Federal Reserve Bank interventions. 
More of the same policies are probably inadequate in the face of the changed world 
economic situation.  
Rather, more sophisticated, consistent and pragmatic investment and technology 
policies will probably need to be sustained for some time to pave the conditions for a 
new phase of economic development cognizant of existing problems and weaknesses, as 
well as strengths and potential. Unfortunately, the continuing preoccupation with inter-
ethnic distributional issues and the continuing ideological denial of the role of industrial 
policy in Malaysian economic development may make an informed public debate in 
Malaysia over such development policies difficult. 
Malaysia is often touted as an example of a fast-growing NIE which has successfully 
achieved economic development through timely economic liberalization. However, this 
paper has shown that a balanced and nuanced consideration of Malaysia’s experience of 
economic development offers lessons for other countries regarding active government 
involvement. But drawing lessons should not be an exercise in mechanical reproduction 
or emulation of specific policies or past best practices ignoring historical conditions and 
specific context. Experimentalism—with efforts to identify and overcome 
‘constraints’—may be promising, but needs to be grounded in creative and innovative 
ways of thinking ‘outside the box’ and identifying appropriate developmental policy 
initiatives. Some of the resulting policy options may be based on the successful 
Malaysian experiences of government intervention as well as critical lessons from failed 
experiences. 
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